LONDON, England (Diya TV) — A recent court ruling against Hamit Coskun, convicted for burning a Quran outside the Turkish consulate in London, has reignited concerns over the re-emergence of blasphemy laws in England, despite their formal abolition in 2008. Critics argue that this case represents a troubling repurposing of public order laws to effectively enforce religious blasphemy codes through the courts.
Coskun was found guilty of a religiously aggravated public order offense, a charge brought under the Crime and Disorder Act. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) and District Judge John McGarva argued that his Quran burning amounted to harassment and distress directed toward Muslims, with the act itself being motivated by religious hostility. However, Coskun’s supporters and civil liberties groups say the conviction dangerously conflates criticism of religion with hatred toward religious people.
“This is an insult to free speech,” said Toby Young, Director of the Free Speech Union. “No one should be prosecuted for burning a copy of the Quran, any more than they should be for burning a Bible. We repealed our blasphemy laws and should not try to bring them back through the back door.”
The case stems from an incident in February 2024 when Coskun burned a Quran outside the Turkish consulate in London. He was subsequently assaulted by Moussa Kadri, who later pleaded guilty to the attack. Despite being the victim of physical violence, Coskun was the one prosecuted for his expression. The CPS’s original indictment framed Islam itself—as a religious institution—as the target of harassment, a legal argument critics say is logically and constitutionally unsound.
Under English law, public order offenses must be directed at individuals or groups capable of suffering harm. Institutions, including religions, are not typically granted this status. Yet the CPS pursued charges suggesting Islam itself had been harmed. The National Secular Society described this as “a significant blow to freedom of expression and a concerning capitulation to Islamic blasphemy codes” [National Secular Society, 2025].
When queried via a Freedom of Information request on how often the CPS had used similar charges treating Islam as a harmed party, the agency declined to provide a full answer, citing the time and effort required to review all recent indictments.
Though the charge was later adjusted to allege that Coskun’s actions caused distress to others and were motivated by anti-Muslim sentiment, critics maintain this legal framing still risks setting a precedent where religious ideas are treated as above reproach. “Social cohesion doesn’t mean we have to respect blasphemy codes,” Young emphasized. “It means we must tolerate diverse views—including those that offend.”
The CPS’s stance, accepted by the court, suggests that the emotional response of individuals to religiously provocative acts could serve as the basis for criminal liability. But free speech advocates argue that this interpretation allows feelings of offense to determine legality, undermining foundational liberal values.
Despite support from civil liberties organizations like the Free Speech Union and the National Secular Society, Coskun was convicted. His case is now drawing comparisons to a slow creep back toward religious censorship. As one commentator put it, “This must not stand. Laws should be made by Parliament, not invented through judicial creativity.”
The implications of the Coskun case go beyond one man’s conviction. They strike at the core of Britain’s commitment to free expression—especially the right to criticize, satirize, or reject religious beliefs without fear of criminal prosecution.
